H.R. 515 and Crimes Against Humanity.

Crimes against humanity are certain acts which are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population or an identifiable part of a population. Crimes against humanity have been prosecuted by International Courts – such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court, as well as in domestic prosecutions. The law of crimes against humanity has primarily developed through the evolution of customary international law. Unlike war crimes and genocide, crimes against humanity are not codified in an international convention, although there is currently an international effort to establish such a treaty, led by the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative.

Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity can be committed during peace or war. They are not isolated or sporadic events, but are part either of a government policy (although the perpetrators need not identify themselves with this policy) or of a wide practice of atrocities tolerated or condoned by a government or a de facto authority. Murder; massacres; dehumanization; (State-organized dehumanization has historically been directed against perceived political, racial, ethnic, national, or minority groups.) extermination; human experimentation; (physical and/or mental) extrajudicial punishments; death squads; forced disappearances (banishment); military use of children; kidnappings; unjust imprisonment; slavery; cannibalism; torture; (physical and/or mental) rape; enforced sterilization; political, racial, or religious persecution that may include the use of blasphemy laws or laws against defamation of religion or other similar wording, or inappropriate hate speech laws; and other inhumane acts may reach the threshold of crimes against humanity if they are part of a widespread or systematic practice.

The United States Government has systematically and without any empirical evidence, chosen a path of persecution of a group of US citizens after their crimes against society, as set out by the Judicial Branch, have been paid in full. The Legislative and Executive Branches of government have chosen to force people into experimental mental health programs without due process. Those branches of government have denied them rights that are unrelated to their crime in violation of judicial processes. The Legislative Branch has passed laws, rules and regulations placing restrictions and obligations upon a disfavored group of American citizens, denying them many privileges that are afforded to all other American citizens.

In the United States as part of our Constitution our forebearers saw the need to limit the power of government. One of the ways that they did this was within our Constitution where they placed some specific constitutional bans. The United States Constitution forbids Legislative Bills of Attainder under Article I, Section 9. The provision forbidding State Law Bills of Attainder, Article I, Section 10, reflects the importance that the framers attached to this issue.

Within the U.S. Constitution, the clauses forbidding Attainder Laws serve two purposes. First, they reinforced the separation of powers, by forbidding the Legislature to perform Judicial or Executive functions—since the outcome of any such acts of Legislature would of necessity take the form of a Bill of Attainder. Second, they embody the concept of due process, which was partially reinforced by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The text of the Constitution, Article I, Section 9; Clause 3 is “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed”.

Now the Legislative Branch without any empirical evidence to justify the laws, nor thought to the damage socially, mentally or physically that their discriminatory laws have on this disfavored group as well as their family members  have again chosen a path that not only is unconstitutional (remember a person’s reputation is a constitutionally protected liberty interest), but also appears to fall into the range of crimes against humanity, except this time, a group of people are looking to challenge the law in hopes returning constitutional sanity to our country. They are looking for plaintiffs to join them in a law suite.

Looking for Plaintiffs – International Megan’s Law Challenge

If you’re getting this message it’s because I believe you can help me.  A number of lawyers are working with me to lay the foundations for a legal challenge to International Megan’s Law if it is signed into law.  H.R. 515 passed  the House this Monday and be sent to President Obama’s desk.

We’re looking for ideal plaintiffs and we need your help to find people who meet one of these criteria:
Does not have a passport, but wants one
Has a passport about to expire
Travels internationally a number of times per year (especially for work)
Has been harassed while traveling in or out of the US based on registration status
If you think you fit any of these four categories, please write to me with the following information:
Age at time of offense
Which of the four (4) categories you fit into
Would you be willing to be a name plaintiff to challenge this law?
State you live in
All responses will be treated as confidential by the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs and Human Rights Defense Center.

Time is of the essence.  Please respond soon and share this with your networks.

Galen Baughman
Soros Justice Fellow
Human Rights Defense Center
11 Dupont Circle, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 681-8121
“Are We All Sex Offenders?” | TEDx Talk

10 comments for “H.R. 515 and Crimes Against Humanity.

  1. Paul
    February 3, 2016 at 3:51 pm

    Smart. Unfortunately this is a battle to be fought in the courts. As we know, politicians (poli comes from poly, which means “many”) (tics=blood sucking parasites) are a group of leaches who are so blind as to what they are doing with our constitution that it shatters one’s faith in humankind. We better hope that the next president appoints level-headed judges and justices to all levels of the judiciary for us to stand any chance.

    • February 4, 2016 at 5:02 am

      Personally, I have little faith in the courts. It bothers me to see folks hoping IML reaches a John “Price Club” Roberts-led Supreme Court. Roberts is anti-Constitutional. Decisions are not made by this “piece of paper” but by the popularity of a law. And sadly, Roberts is young for a Chef Justice. We could see a lifetime of the degradation of rights.

      Lawsuits are very expensive and lets face it, there just aren’t enough resources to go around and the few who have the resources hoard it for themselves. I don’t know about SOSEN, but donations to Once Fallen are so rare, I can’t complete most of the projects I have created, and I live off $753 a month. Thus, I can’t invest in a lawsuit. I suspect most folks are in the same boat.

      • Paul
        February 4, 2016 at 1:08 pm

        What I would hope (maybe this is naive on my part) is that there would be some decent pro bono lawyers who understand we aren’t the wealthiest demographic in the world and who believe in this cause. Also, Roberts is only one vote. Without getting too political, this next presidential election will be important as to the tipping of the scales. Some justices (Ginsberg, etc) have historically dissented. But you’re right, Derek, I don’t have a lot of optimism either.

  2. Charles the Polymath
    February 9, 2016 at 6:56 am

    Good morning~

    This comment on the newly signed IML. I am still confused about this IML thing. Maybe you or someone can clear this up for me by answering a few simple questions: Just who are these RSOs that are allowed to travel internationally? What state allows their RSOs to do so? Most definitely NOT allowed to travel out of state here in Texas let alone out of the Country I can tell you that from personal experience. And just how does an ex-con get a passport? I always thought red flags went up and fireworks went off when someone with a criminal record filed for a passport but maybe I was wrong I don’t know. And, even if an RSO did get lucky and got a passport and then got out of the Country, why would he/she ever come back to the US? Anyway, I guess the fact that Congress saw fit to have this kind of law in place and the President signed it into law tells me that RSOs can and do get to travel outside the Country. Could it be anybody else but TX? I just hate I don’t know which states allow people on the registry to do so because TX show ain’t one of them. Therefore, if anyone knows, somebody please let me know what states allow RSOs to travel internationally.

  3. Will Bassler
    February 9, 2016 at 8:44 am

    A person’s reputation and standing in the community are a protected liberty interest as described by United States Supreme Court rulings

    The United States Supreme Court has previously recognized that a person’s reputation is a protected liberty interest under the federal due process clause. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (hereafter “Constantineau”); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (hereafter “Roth”).

    In Constantineau, the State of Wisconsin authorized the posting of a notice prohibiting the sale or gift of liquor to any person who “‘by excessive drinking’ produces described conditions or exhibits specified traits, such as exposing himself or family ‘to want’ or becoming ‘dangerous to the peace’ of the community.” On appeal, the Constantineau Court recognized that “t would be naive not to recognize that such ‘posting’ or characterizati on of an individual will expose him to public embarrassment and ridicule.” 400 U.S. at 436. The Court therefore held that a protectible liberty interest is implicated “[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him [or her.]” Id. at 437.

    One year later, the Court again recognized a person’s liberty interest may be implicated by damage to his or her reputation. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. The plaintiff in Roth, a university professor, alleged that “the failure of University officials to give him notice of any reason for nonretention and an opportunity for a hearing violated his right to procedural due process of law.” Id. at 569. The Roth Court reasoned that, in declining to hire the plaintiff, the state had neither advanced “any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the community” nor “imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id. at 573. The Roth Court noted, however, that “a different case” would have been presented had the state either damaged the plaintiff’s reputation or imposed a stigma on him. Id. at 573-74.

    However, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, reh’g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976), the Court clarified that “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is [n]either ‘liberty’ [n]or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 701. The plaintiff in Paul alleged a deprivation of liberty without due process of law after the circulation of flyers publicizing his conviction for shoplifting and labeling him an “active shoplifter.” Id. at 712. According to the Paul Court, because the plaintiff’s harm was not accompanied by the alteration of “a right or status previously recognized by state law,” there was no deprivation of a protectible liberty interest. Id. at 711-12.

    Paul has been interpreted to require “stigma plus” in order to establish a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1994). In other words,

    an allegation that government dissemination of information or government defamation has caused damage to reputation, even with all the attendant emotional anguish and social stigma, does not in itself state a cause of action for violation of a constitutional right; infringement of more ‘tangible interests’ . . . must be alleged as well.

    Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Marshall v. University of Hawaii, 9 Haw. App. 21, 32, 821 P.2d 937, 948 (1991).

    For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Bani has shown substantial injury to both his reputation and other “tangible interests.” This case does not therefore require us to determine whether a person’s reputation alone constitutes a protected liberty interest under the Hawai`i Constitution. Suffice it to say that Bani has established that the public notification provisions of HRS chapter 846E implicate a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution.

    First, Bani has demonstrated that the public notification provisions of HRS chapter 846E will likely cause harm to his reputation. The statute effectively brands Bani a “sex offender,” i.e., a public danger, for life. See Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafterPataki III]; Doe v. Attorney General, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (Mass. 1997) [hereinafter Doe II];see also Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1436 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).

    Specifically, HRS chapter 846E’s public notification provisions imply that Bani is potentially dangerous, thereby undermining his reputation and standing in the community. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 419 (N.J. 1995); cf. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that ”

    ne need only look to the increasingly popular ‘Megan’s laws,’ whereby states require sex offenders to register with law enforcement officials who are then authorized to release information about the sex offender to the public, to comprehend the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex offender”). Indeed, public notification that Bani is a convicted sex offender implicitly announces that, in the eyes of the State, Bani presents a risk of committing another sex offense. Doe II, 686 N.E.2d at 144.

    Second, Bani will foreseeably suffer serious harm to other “tangible interests” as a result of registration as a sex offender. Potential employers and landlords will foreseeably be reluctant to employ or rent to Bani once they learn of his status as a “sex offender.” See Pataki III, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468; W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1219 (D.N.J. 1996), rev’d, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998) [hereinafter Verniero]; see also In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (quoting In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1973)). (8) Indeed, the public disclosure provisions of HRS chapter 846E canadversely affect an offender’s personal and professional life, employability, associations with neighbors, and choice of housing. Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Or. 1998); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Alaska 1994), appeal dismissed, 85 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996) (personal and professional lives); Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D.N.J. 1995),aff’d in part and vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.), reh’g denied, 83 F.2d 594 (1996) (employability and associations with neighbors); Robin L. Deems, Comment, California’s Sex Offender Notification Statute: A Constitutional Analysis, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 1195 (1996) (citing Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey’s Megan’s Law, 3 J. L. & Pol’y 569, 580-81 (1995)) (choice of housing). In addition, public disclosure may encourage vigilantism and may expose the offender to possible physical violence. (9)See, e.g., Poritz, 662 A.2d at 430-31 (Stein, J., dissenting); Pataki I, 940 F. Supp. 603, 608-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1485 (W.D. Wash. 1997). Indeed,

    [w]hen a government agency focuses its machinery on the task of determining whether a person should be labeled publicly as having a certain undesirable characteristic or belonging to a certain undesirable group, and that agency must by law gather and synthesize evidence outside the public record in making that determination, the interest of the person to be labeled goes beyond mere reputation. . . . t is an interest in avoiding the social ostracism, loss of employment opportunities, and significant likelihood of verbal and, perhaps, even physical harassment likely to follow from designation.
    Noble, 964 P.2d at 995-96. Therefore, HRS chapter 846E is highly likely to cause irreparable harm to Bani’s reputation and professional life, employability, associations with neighbors, and choice of housing.

    The Paul Court recognized that, in addition to the interests recognized by state law, “[t]here are other interests . . . protected not by virtue of their recognition by the law of a particular State but because they are guaranteed in one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which has been ‘incorporated’ into the Fourteenth Amendment.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 710 n.5. As an example, in Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1436 n.4, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found a protectible interest in reputation where the stigma of being identified as a child abuser was tied to the protectible interest in privacy and autonomy of family relationships. See also Poritz, 662 A.2d at 419 (holding that the stigma resulting from notification that petitioner was a sex offender was tied to the protectible interest in privacy inasmuch as he had an interest in his reputation); Neal, 131 F.3d at 830 (holding that Hawaii’s designating of prisoner as “sex offender” without hearing and requiring successful completion of treatment program as precondition for parole eligibility together implicated a liberty interest protected by the right to due process of law).

    Under these circumstances, we are persuaded by the following considerations that Bani has a liberty interest protected by the Hawai`i Constitution that entitles him to procedural due process: (1) the public disclosure of accumulated and synthesized personal information that would not otherwise be easily available; (2) the potential harm to his personal and professional life; (3) the foreseeable harm to his reputation; and (4) the statutory branding of him as a public danger, i.e., as a sex offender. We note that the “interest cannot be captured in a single word or phrase. It is an interest in knowing when the government is moving against you and why it has singled you out for special attention. It is an interest in avoiding the secret machinations of a Star Chamber.” Noble, 964 P.2d at 995.

  4. Will Bassler
    February 9, 2016 at 8:53 am

    What is the state’s reasoning for the need for sex offenders to register and the community be notified of their existence in the community. Primarily the state has said that sex offenders have a high possibility of reoffending meaning that they have low impulse control or in simple terms that they are mentally ill and cannot control themselves and are thereby a danger to the community. The high re-offense rate that is cited as the rationale for the laws has been proven time and again to not exist except in the minds of the bigots who are attempting to take away the constitutional rights of American citizens.

    Even the mentally ill have more rights than sex offenders before a mentally ill person can be committed they must have their day in court because of the stigmatizing effect of being called a mentally ill person they have constitutional ly protected rights under due process. the determination whether a person is dangerous beyond reasonable doubt must focus on his or her condition at the time of the commitment hearing. a person’s actions and statements which occurred prior to the commitment hearing are probative as to his present mental condition but mere recitation of past acts in the absence of a showing that such clearly forms a foundation for a prediction of future dangerousness cannot serve as a basis for finding that one is a mentally ill person who is dangerous to himself or others.

    In the case of a person at liberty in the community who has proposed to be involuntary committed it is imperative that the need for his confinement be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence of a real and present danger which he poses to himself or to others moreover it is essential that the evidence which forms the basis of the decision to deprive a citizen of his liberty be more concrete more and more reliable than the mere expectation or probability that the person will engage in dangerous behavior in the future further the federal courts have provided that no person should be committed or recommitted unless there is a finding of recent over acts of the individual evidencing danger to himself or others and that the necessary for commitment or re-commitment must be proved by evidence which is clear unequivocal and convincing allows the need for re-commitment to be established by the evidence providing some factual basis to support the need for re-commitment.

    And finally the courts have said that conclusions based on conjecture as to whether an appellate poses a danger to others are insufficient. Further more the United States Supreme Court has stated “none of our decisions hold that a conviction for a crime entitles the state not only to confine the convicted person but also to determine that that person has a mental illness … such consequences visited on the prisoner are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristic ally suffered by a person convicted of a crime”. While a criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individuals right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, they do not authorize the state to classify him as mentally ill.

    If sex offenders have a mental deficiency or have a mental illness then they are entitled to due process before having their names placed on a public list or having to register. if we do not than what is the rational basis for the law, quite obviously there is NOT a high reoffend rate that proponents of the registry have lied about to legislative and judicial branches of the government either for their own personal gain or for revenge.

    Another point must be made that all sex offenders fall into the classification of felons and felons are a group or classification . the question is are sex offenders being treated the same as all other felons do other felons have to register or have the community notified of their presence after they have completed their sentence. Are they being denied state and government services are other felons restricted where they can live, work and recreate. The courts have found that a distinction among members of the class of offenders is irrational regardless of the importance of public safety consideration underlying the regulations or relevance of prior convictions simply discerning any regulatory reason however plausible, will not serve to satisfy the rational basis requirement of equal protection; relevant inquiry more properly focuses on whether the means utilized to carry out the regulatory purpose substantially furthers that end. And the regulation will be considered vague and overbroad if it gives no consideration to the nature, circumstances and seriousness of the crime, the time elapsed since the conviction or the degree of the misdemeanants rehabilitation . in so far as regulations discriminating irrationally among classes of ex-offenders violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment and will not stand.

    We must realize that we are not talking about sex offenses here we are talking about only the possibility of re-offense and the US Supreme Court has stated mere negative attitudes or fear, of the unsubstantiate d by factors which are properly cognizable in a statute are not a permissible basis for treating a group different than others it is plain that the electorarate as a whole whether it be by referendum or otherwise could not order a city action to violate the equal protection clause and the city may not avoid the strictures of that clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic, private bias may be outside the reach of the law but the law cannot directly or indirectly give them effect or to put it the way that the United States Supreme Court said in LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (02-102) 539 U.S. 558 (2003) We have consistently held, however, that some objectives, such as “a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” are not legitimate state interests. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, supra, at 534. See also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, supra, at 446—447; Romer v. Evans, supra, at 632. When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause. In Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, for example, we held that a law preventing those households containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the household from receiving food stamps violated equal protection because the purpose of the law was to “ ‘discriminate against hippies.’ ” 413 U.S., at 534. The asserted governmental interest in preventing food stamp fraud was not deemed sufficient to satisfy rational basis review. Id., at 535—538. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447—455 (1972), we refused to sanction a law that discriminated between married and unmarried persons by prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to single persons. Likewise, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, supra, we held that it was irrational for a State to require a home for the mentally disabled to obtain a special use permit when other residences–like fraternity houses and apartment buildings–did not have to obtain such a permit. And in Romer v. Evans, we disallowed a state statute that “impos[ed] a broad and undifferentiat ed disability on a single named group”–specifically, homosexuals. 517 U.S., at 632.

    Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classification s must not be “drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.” Id., at 633. Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection Clause prevents a State from creating “a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake.” Id., at 635. And because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior. The Texas sodomy law “raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.” Id., at 634.

    “The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.” Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112—113 (1949) (concurring opinion).

    In closing, we cannot help but make this observation with the mountain of evidence showing that there is no high re-offense rate for people involved in sex crimes. And that over 99% of all new sex crimes are not committed by registered citizens. And that the original legislation was based on lies, fabrications and myths. not to mention the obvious violations of these legislative acts have against both state and federal constitutions. Constitutions that were set in place to protect individual rights against the overpowering control of the government. Why is it then that legislators continue to add new laws further compounding the damage to registered citizens and their families and less of course, those legislators have no concern for the Constitution and individual rights of the common citizen that they have sworn to protect.

    • Mil
      February 12, 2016 at 7:38 am

      Will Bassler: Are you an attorney or a law student? I do not know much about laws, but was impressed reading your posting. We need more people to speak out against these non-sense laws that help no one, but harm many and represent a financial burden the US already troubled economy

  5. Charles the Polymath
    February 9, 2016 at 11:31 am

    Please forgive my ingnorance but I just completed fact checking on ex-cons, passports, and leaving the country and found that the US Passport Office has no restrictions on ex-cons applying for a passport. As a matter of fact, I don’t think they evern run back ground checks on people leaving the U.S. and evidently they don’t care about RSOs leaving the country, otherwise there would be no need to have an International Megan’s Law (IML) thing now would it? Mmmm. I apparently overthought this IML thing. My reasoning was, hey, RSOs can’t leave the country, that can’t ever get a passport so why a law targeting them with a Scarlet Letter on a passports??? Wrong on both counts because my reasoning was flawed. Now I know RSOs can leave the country. So my next question is: since RSOs can leave the country, why the hell come bacK? The only reason I can think of is their family. Well, my solution to that is, scream—loudly— political asylum once you got where you going and after you get yourself together financially, send for your family and start a brand new life all over again and guess what? not a damn SO registry either—how does that sound?

    • Asylum possibility
      February 10, 2016 at 7:34 pm

      Asylum sounds goods, but check the country first. Many do have registries, but most are not public like what “Merica has. Of course, you could be like the chap in England today who is from Cali and the Brits won’t return him for court because of the potential sentencing he may face.

  6. kayt
    February 10, 2016 at 12:03 pm

    Charles, the Polymath, I think things are about to change!

    But, I also think that you are wrong.

    I know that the no fly lists have included most people who were in prison, so how can it be that registered people can fly???

    Anyone with proof??

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