When the United States government damages a person’s reputation by implying without any specific proof about that singular person that they are dangerous simply because they are members of a group that the legislative branch of government has chosen to disfranchised. Then it is time for the courts to step in and make the government prove on each and every occasion that each individual of that group, Under all circumstances is in fact, dangerous!. Without that proof of future dangerousness, which can not be proven, then you can say that a person’s reputation and standing in the international community have been damaged. and that the government is in fact, responsible and should be held accountable for that damage.
A person’s reputation and standing in the community are a protected liberty interest as described by United States Supreme Court rulings as laid out in the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in State of Hawaii v Bani. Below is an excerpt from the Hawaii Supreme Court decision.
The United States Supreme Court has previously recognized that a person’s reputation is a protected liberty interest under the federal due process clause. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (hereafter “Constantineau”); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (hereafter “Roth”).
In Constantineau, the State of Wisconsin authorized the posting of a notice prohibiting the sale or gift of liquor to any person who “‘by excessive drinking’ produces described conditions or exhibits specified traits, such as exposing himself or family ‘to want’ or becoming ‘dangerous to the peace’ of the community.” On appeal, the Constantineau Court recognized that “[i]t would be naive not to recognize that such ‘posting’ or characterization of an individual will expose him to public embarrassment and ridicule.” 400 U.S. at 436. The Court therefore held that a protectible liberty interest is implicated “[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him [or her.]” Id. at 437.
One year later, the Court again recognized a person’s liberty interest may be implicated by damage to his or her reputation. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. The plaintiff in Roth, a university professor, alleged that “the failure of University officials to give him notice of any reason for non-retention and an opportunity for a hearing violated his right to procedural due process of law.” Id. at 569. The Roth Court reasoned that in declining to hire the plaintiff, the state had neither advanced “any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the community” nor “imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id. at 573. The Roth Court noted, however, that “a different case” would have been presented had the state either damaged the plaintiff’s reputation or imposed a stigma on him. Id. at 573-74.
However, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, reh’g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976), the Court clarified that “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is [n]either ‘liberty’ [n]or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 701. The plaintiff in Paul alleged a deprivation of liberty without due process of law after the circulation of flyers publicizing his conviction for shoplifting and labeling him an “active shoplifter.” Id. at 712. According to the Paul Court, because the plaintiff’s harm was not accompanied by the alteration of “a right or status previously recognized by state law,” there was no deprivation of a protectible liberty interest. Id. at 711-12.
Paul has been interpreted to require “stigma plus” in order to establish a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1994). In other words, “an allegation that government dissemination of information or government defamation has caused damage to reputation, even with all the attendant emotional anguish and social stigma, does not in itself state a cause of action for violation of a constitutional right, infringement of more ‘tangible interests’ must be alleged as well”.
Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Marshall v. University of Hawaii, 9 Haw. App. 21, 32, 821 P.2d 937, 948 (1991).
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Bani has shown substantial injury to both his reputation and other “tangible interests.” This case does not therefore require us to determine whether a person’s reputation alone constitutes a protected liberty interest under the Hawaii Constitution. Suffice it to say that Bani has established that the public notification provisions of HRS chapter 846E implicate a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution.
First; Bani has demonstrated that the public notification provisions of HRS chapter 846E will likely cause harm to his reputation. The statute effectively brands Bani a “sex offender”, i.e., a public danger, for life. See Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [here in after Pataki III]; Doe v. Attorney General, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (Mass. 1997) [hereinafter Doe II];see also Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1436 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
Specifically, HRS chapter 846E’s public notification provisions imply that Bani is potentially dangerous, thereby undermining his reputation and standing in the community. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 419 (N.J. 1995); cf. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[o]ne need only look to the increasingly popular ‘Megan’s laws’, whereby states require sex offenders to register with law enforcement officials, who are then authorized to release information about the sex offender to the public, to comprehend the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex offender”). Indeed, public notification that Bani is a convicted sex offender implicitly announces that, in the eyes of the State, Bani presents a risk of committing another sex offense. Doe II, 686 N.E.2d at 144.
Second; Bani will foreseeably suffer serious harm to other “tangible interests” as a result of registration as a sex offender. Potential employers and landlords will thus foreseeably be reluctant to employ or rent to Bani once they learn of his status as a “sex offender”. See Pataki III, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468; W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1219 (D.N.J. 1996), rev’d, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998) [hereinafter Verniero]; see also In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (quoting In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1973)). (8). Indeed, the public disclosure provisions of HRS chapter 846E can adversely affect an offender’s personal and professional life, employability, associations with neighbors and choice of housing. Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Or. 1998); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Alaska 1994), appeal dismissed, 85 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996) (personal and professional lives); Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D.N.J. 1995),aff’d in part and vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.), reh’g denied, 83 F.2d 594 (1996) (employability and associations with neighbors); Robin L. Deems, Comment, California’s Sex Offender Notification Statute: A Constitutional Analysis, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 1195 (1996) (citing Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey’s Megan’s Law, 3 J. L. & Pol’y 569, 580-81 (1995)) (choice of housing). In addition, public disclosure may encourage vigilantism and may expose the offender to possible physical violence. (9)See, e.g., Poritz, 662 A.2d at 430-31 (Stein, J., dissenting); Pataki I, 940 F. Supp. 603, 608-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1485 (W.D. Wash. 1997). Indeed, [w]hen a government agency focuses its machinery on the task of determining whether a person should be labeled publicly as having a certain undesirable characteristic or belonging to a certain undesirable group, and that agency must by law gather and synthesize evidence outside the public record in making that determination, the interest of the person to be labeled goes beyond mere reputation. . . . [I]t is an interest in avoiding the social ostracism, loss of employment opportunities, and significant likelihood of verbal and, perhaps, even physical harassment likely to follow from designation.
Noble, 964 P.2d at 995-96. Therefore, HRS chapter 846E is highly likely to cause irreparable harm to Bani’s reputation and professional life, employability, associations with neighbors, and choice of housing.
The Paul Court recognized that, in addition to the interests recognized by state law, “[t]here are other interests . . . protected not by virtue of their recognition by the law of a particular State but because they are guaranteed in one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which has been ‘incorporated’ into the Fourteenth Amendment.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 710 n.5. As an example, in Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1436 n.4, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found a protectible interest in reputation where the stigma of being identified as a child abuser was tied to the protectible interest in privacy and autonomy of family relationships. See also Poritz, 662 A.2d at 419 (holding that the stigma resulting from notification that petitioner was a sex offender was tied to the protectible interest in privacy inasmuch as he had an interest in his reputation); Neal, 131 F.3d at 830 (holding that Hawaii’s designating of prisoner as “sex offender” without hearing and requiring successful completion of treatment program as precondition for parole eligibility together implicated a liberty interest protected by the right to due process of law).
Under these circumstances, we are persuaded by the following considerations that Bani has a liberty interest protected by the Hawaii Constitution that entitles him to procedural due process: (1) the public disclosure of accumulated and synthesized personal information that would not otherwise be easily available; (2) the potential harm to his personal and professional life; (3) the foreseeable harm to his reputation; and (4) the statutory branding of him as a public danger, i.e., as a sex offender. We note that the “interest cannot be captured in a single word or phrase. It is an interest in knowing when the government is moving against you and why it has singled you out for special attention. It is an interest in avoiding the secret machinations of a Star Chamber.” Noble, 964 P.2d at 995.