We as Registered Citizens feel Empathy for the Families at our Borders

This may seem a little unusual post coming from a registered citizens advocacy group. but make no mistake register citizens have families too, many of us have children that we are attempting to raise to be good American citizens and because of our status as registered citizens we fully understand the trauma caused by the government to children and family members. you only have to take a look at our articles ( /blog/2018/04/19/government-sanctioned-cruelty-to-over-half-a-million-american-children.html )  (/blog/2018/04/23/collateral-banishment-of-spouses-and-children-2.html )  to understand our position. Our children have been and continue to be traumatized by the actions of the our government. Because of this more so than other groups we fully understand the trauma that is going on at the border at the present time, both for the children and their parents. and since we have had to deal with it for a long period of time we offer this information.

Our court system has long held that the family unit is more important than any other concept within this Republics Constitution.

Our United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of the family unit  “this Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage, family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Claus of the 14 Amendment.” Cleveland Board of Education vs. LaFleur 94 S. Ct. 791. “there does exist a privet realm of the family life which the state can not enter,” Prince vs. Mass. 64 S. Ct 438, that has been afforded both substantive and procedural protection. “We deal with the right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights older than our political parties, older that our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is the association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social protests. Yet is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decision.” Griswold vs. Connecticut, 85 S. Ct. 1678.

Almost all of the case sightings below have a component of both the first and the 14th amendment there are a couple in here that are just First Amendment. it should be noted that any person within the confines of the United States rather they are a citizen or not is entitled to the constitutional protections afforded to every other person within this country.

The idea behind putting the case citing here with a brief excerpt after them it gives people that are doing legal research a place to look especially if they can shepherdize the case and see what newer cases have used prior decisions to strengthen their arguments.

There is an inalienable right to having a family or being a member of a family this includes sex offenders the primary example is a person who was in a state hospital for treatment because he was a sex offender he challenged conditions of confinement including his right to have visitations by his children and grandchildren.
CAMERON V. TOMES 783 F Supp 1511 /3/4 / 6/19 / 23/24 / Patients right to be grand­father… prohibiting him from visiting with his grandchildren was a clear restriction of his liberty,

Elton v. Tucker 81 SCt247 /4/5/8/9/ associational ties impairs freedom if forced to disclose first and 14th amend

Smith v. Organ 97 SCt 2094 @ 2109 family /marriage Parient/child /Poe v. Gerstein 517 F2d 787 2/5/Privacy of the family @794

 Newborn v. Morrison 440 F 6»pp 623 /5/6/9/family association

Duchesns v. Sugarinan 566 F2d 817 /24/5/6/7/Right of the family to stay together

Staney v. Geogia /3/4/5/6/7/8/9/10/11/12/State does not have the right to control moral content of a person’s thoughts 

Flanagan v. State 846 P2d 1053 @1056 freedom of thought

Mich. v. Babin 799 F Supp 695 @ 716 #43 Freedom of thought

Healy v. james 92 SCt 2338 @ 2349 freedom of speech and thought

Hodgson v. Minn. 100 SCt 2926 @ 2942/43parent/child

Moore v. Cleveland 97 SCt 1932 @ 1935 Family rights

GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT 85 SCt 1678 4/7/8/9/Freedom   of thought/speech   and association  NINETH AMEND. PRIVACY

Aristotle v. Johnson 721 F Supp 100 2/3/4/5/01006/7 Family Ruff v. leavenworth 858 F Supp 1546 @   1555

Zockert v. Fanning 800 P2d 773 Parents are entitled to equal treatment

Now as much as there are federal court decisions including our United States Supreme Court that gives the rights of the family to stay together priority. I think it is time to point out that these cases and decisions will not allow new legislation or acts of Congress and especially not rules and regulations made up by the executive branch, which is outside their authority to do so. Laws must be specifically laid out by the legislative branch with full explanation about how they are to be carried out. any attempt by the legislative branch to allow the executive branch to define legislation is a violation of the non-delegation of authority doctrine. Any attempt to do so by the legislative branch to supersede decisions through new legislation that has been set by the court about constitutionality of laws is a violation of the vested rights doctrine.

Note most of this information is tailored for explained as pertains to registered citizens, but nonetheless it also pertains to anyone who has been charged with a crime within the United States.

Vested rights doctrine (stops the legislature from wordsmithing laws after a judgment)
“It is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when those actions have passed into judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases. ”McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (U.S. 1898) “A vested right ensures “certainty and fairness” to the defendant so that he can be confident that a subsequently enacted regulation will not affect him.” (see The Yale Law Journal Volume 96, Number 6, May 1987.

Vested rights doctrine protects a person or group who have won a legal decision from a legislature seeking to overturn the decision. The doctrine has two components.

First, it protects the property right obtained by the victorious party against a taking of that property by the legislature. In this sense the protection is similar to constitutional protection of contractual rights by the Contract Clause .

Second, and equally important, “vested rights” doctrine safeguards separation of powers against overreaching by the legislature. “[C]onsistent with the separation of powers, it protects judicial action from superior legislative review, ‘a regime [that would be] obviously inconsistent with due process of law and subversive of the judicial branch of government.'” Georgia Ass’n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).

“Vested rights” doctrine was first announced in McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898): “It is not within the power of the legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by judgment. Legislation may act on subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when those actions have passed into judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases.”

Doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
Doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is a rule of constitutional law that bars a government from imposing a condition on the grant of a benefit requiring the waiver of a constitutional right. (Such as being forced in to signing parole and probation or treatment provider agreements that were not stipulated by the courts as part of punishment.) The government cannot condition a person’s receipt of a governmental benefit on the waiver of a constitutional ly protected right. It also refers to the rule that government cannot force a defendant to choose between two constitutionally protected rights.

Abuse of Rights Law & Legal Definition
The doctrine of Abuse of Rights, found in various guises in Civil Law jurisdictions, refers to the concept that the malicious or antisocial exercise of otherwise legitimate rights can give rise to civil liability. In general terms, the doctrine of abuse of rights provides that ‘fault’ in the delictual sense. It may be imposed upon a party who has exercised a right in a manner that has caused injury to another. At least one of four conditions is required to invoke the doctrine: (1) the predominant motive for exercising the right is to cause harm; (2) no serious or legitimate motive exists for exercising the right; (3) the exercise of the right is against moral rules, good faith, or elementary fairness; or (4) the right is exercised for a purpose other than that for which it was granted.

Nondelegation Doctrine

nondelegation doctrine (stops one branch of government primarily the legislative branch from allowing other branches of government to make rules. All laws passed must be completely defined by the legislative branch they cannot pass the rulemaking authority on to other branches in the case of the judicial branch and they cannot pass their authority to make rules pertaining to judgments to other branches of government such as parole and probation which is part of the executive branch)

The doctrine of nondelegation describes the theory that one branch of government must not authorize another entity to exercise the power or function which it is constitutional ly authorized to exercise itself. It is explicit or implicit in all written constitutions that impose a strict structural separation of powers. It is usually applied in questions of constitutional ly improper delegations of powers of any of the three branches of government to either of the other, to the administrative state, or to private entities. Although it is usually constitutional for executive officials to delegate executive powers to executive branch subordinates, there can also be improper delegations of powers within an executive branch.

Non delegation doctrine is a principle of administrative law that Congress cannot delegate its legislative powers to agencies. Delegation is permitted only if Congress prescribes clear and adequate standards to guide an executive agency in making the policy. There should be an “intelligible principle” for the agencies to base their regulations on.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, vests all legislative powers in the Congress of the United States. The text permits no delegation of those powers, and so when Congress confers decision making authority upon agencies Congress must lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. The degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionall y conferred. [Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’Ns, 531 U.S. 457 (U.S. 2001)]
Nondelegation doctrine is also known as delegation doctrine.

Case law nondelegation doctrine
During the 1930s, Congress provided the executive branch with wide powers to combat the Great Depression. The Supreme Court case of Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) involved the National Industrial Recovery Act, which included a provision granting the President the authority to prohibit the interstate shipment of petroleum in excess of certain quotas. In the Panama Refining case, however, the Court struck down the provision on the ground that Congress had set “no criterion to govern the President’s course.”
Other provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act were also challenged. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), the Supreme Court considered a provision which permitted the President to approve trade codes, drafted by the businesses themselves, so as to ensure “fair competition.” The Supreme Court found that, since the law sets no explicit guidelines, businesses “may roam at will and the President may approve or disapprove their proposal as he may see fit.” Thus, they struck down the relevant provisions of the Recovery Act.

The Supreme Court invalidated laws as violations of the nondelegation doctrine. Exemplifying the Court’s legal reasoning on this matter, it ruled in the 1998 case Clinton v. City of New York that the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, which authorized the President to selectively void portions of appropriation bills, was a violation of the Presentment Clause, which sets forth the formalities governing the passage of legislation. Although the Court noted that the attorneys prosecuting the case had extensively discussed the nondelegation doctrine, the Court declined to consider that question. However, Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, wrote that he would have found the statute to violate the exclusive responsibility for laws to be made by Congress.

The next year, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Supreme Court found numerous failings in another piece of New Deal legislation, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act. Among the shortcomings, the Court said, was the ability of some coal companies to set standards for wages and hours for the entire industry. This, the Court ruled, was a delegation of legislative authority to private industry. “This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form,” Justice George Sutherland wrote for the Court’s majority, “for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body . . . but to private persons . . . .”

Nondelegation doctrine the courts
Just exactly what are conditions that can be placed on a person on PNP? Well first of all those conditions have to be related to the crime that has put the person under the control of the judicial system. Recognize that it is not executive branch that has the authority to put those restrictions on a person. Only the judicial branch has the authority to place restrictions on a person for a criminal activity. Those restrictions have to #1 relate directly to the crime and #2 aide in a person’s reintegration into society. Even the courts have to follow these guidelines.

The trial court is given wide discretion in establishing conditions of probation, and the order of the district judge providing for probation will be overturned only if it is abuse of discretion. ( United States v. Kahl, 583 F2d 1351 (CA5 Tex 1978). )  While the court can adopt terms and conditions of probation recommended to it by an administrative agency of government, The court cannot delegate it’s power to fix terms and conditions of probation. ( Whitehead v. United States, 155 F2d 460 (CA6 Tenn 1946). ) or to determine the parties aggrieved, the amounts to be paid, and the time and manner of payment. United States v. Mancuso, 444 F2d 691 (CA5 La 1971). ) (  United States v. Shelby, 573 F2d 971 (CA7 Wis 1978).    ) The court must orally give the conditions of probation,  ( Buhler v. Pescor, 63 F Supp 632 (DC Mo 1945). ) and when there is a discrepancy between conditions given orally and conditions given in writing, the oral statements control. (NOTE: what this means is that PNP cannot add to or change the requirements that were given by the judge at the time of sentencing.) (  United States v. Mesfin Haile Tulloch, 380 F3d 8 (CA1 Mass 2004).  ) If one condition of probation is void, it does not invalidate the sentence. (Watkins v. Merry, 106 F2d 360 (CA10 Okla 1939).) it should be noted that the court cannot lay blanket conditions that are recommended by the executive branch without first looking at the need for each of those conditions and spelling them out explicitly so that both the defendant and PNP know exactly the conditions of parole or probation.

Conditions: The 2nd Circuit, in U.S. v. Myers, ruled that if the liberty interest at stake in a decision involving a condition of release is fundamental, a deprivation of that liberty is “reasonably necessary” only if the deprivation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Courts of appeals have consistently required district courts to set forth factual findings to justify special probation conditions.Uni ted States v. Warren, 186 F3d 358 (CA3 NJ 1999).  It is not enough that the required findings are implicit in the record. The District Court is required to give reasons on the record for imposition of special conditions of supervised release.U.S. v. Hahn, 551 F3d 977 (10th Cir. 2008).  A district court’s failure to state its reasons for conditioning supervised release results at a minimum in a remand. U.S. v. Kravchuk, 335 F3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2003).  it should be noted here that most courts and for that matter, defense attorneys are not doing their job. They are simply taking the suggestions for blanket requirements from PNP and this needs to stop.

As is noted in this article ( http://online.wsj.com/article/AP24d843af7f4146a78a475212daeb0d1d.html ) the penalties have to relate to the underlying crime not to prior criminal actions and if those penalties/regulations are unrelated to the crime then they are illegally imposed, rather it comes from the court or from PNP.

It also should be noted that, should a judge or members of the executive branch step outside their legal boundaries that like all public officials, they can be sued for financial damages including pain-and-suffering under a 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights action. For damages including pain and suffering. Remember the recent Supreme Court decision http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/03/supreme-court-rules-for-pro-se-prisoner-in-sovereign-immunity-case.php That basically said that any official of the government, who steps outside his legal boundaries, can bring about a suit against the organization that he represents. In other words, if the executive branch officer steps outside his/her constitutional boundaries rather knowingly or unknowingly they can be charged with a crime under USC title 18 section 241 through 244 crime.

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