Grab a cup of coffee and some snacks because this is a long One

Mind game: a lawsuit put together in 2014 to challenge the Nebraska Registry there is some good information in here and a number of case citing its that may be useful. This lawsuit was laid out so that both offenders and family members could join in seeking damages. I got sidetracked and never completed it.

I’ve Written and rewritten this thing four times, in order to try to make sure the data is both accurate, and concise.  I’ve been away for some time, working and studying.  I found that my understanding of many things was insufficient, and the historic background thereof was also insufficient.  Much of this has been remedied.  Unfortunately, there’s a great deal of bias within the court, specifically on the issue of congress, and the powers of the state.

Those in the United states, in general are citizens of the United States.  This citizenship gives specific privileges and immunities, under article 4 of the constitution, as well as rights under the 14th amendment to that document.

Not many in the last few centuries have paid much attention to that article 4 prohibition against the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution, and in fact, the supreme court has avoided the issue like the plague.

The Prudence Crandall case discused it, as did Dred Scott.  The very wording of the title 18, section 242, as well as title 42, section 1983, and the 14th amendment itself under which those laws were reestablished comes from Dred Scott v. Sandford.

Quote

For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the police [p417] regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and insubordinatio n among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the State.

Exemption from special and targeted laws… freedom to travel.  Freedom to choose your labor, choose your work, choose your trade, to make any business whatsoever, so long as you committed no crime while doing so.  Freedom to speak, freedom to associate, freedom to hold meetings, and to keep and bear arms wherever one went.

Between the Prudence Crandall case and the Dred Scott case, these privileges and immunites were recognized by the states.  It was not until Cruikshanks that they changed, and the tortured claim was made that those privileges and immunities, having preexisted the constitution, were not protected by it.

Among these current privileges and immunities of citizen are the right to not have bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties enacted upon them.  This is a primary issue of the republican form of government, a restriction on the intermingling of powers between departments of government, and bearing only one exception, the attaint for treason in the case of the Congress, and then subject only to the levying of forces for the purpose of war, or giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States.

Bills of attainder are best illustrated in the discussion of Cummings, but there is far more jurisprudence than just Cummings involved.  The discussions range from Cummings to land cases in Georgia to the very essence of citizenship itself.

Loss of citizenship, for instance, within the Trop v. Dulles case, was judged to be a cruel and unusual punishment, pursuant to the 8th amendment, for losing the ‘right to have rights’.  It was yet another attainder case, though couched in different words.  Congress, in all of the powers it possesses, does not have the authority to divest citizenship, nor does it have the authority to divest the rights involved in citizenship, the privileges or immunities attached to that citizenship, nor divest the individual of his political existence.

The rights of citizenship are the essence thereof; without those rights, there is not any value to citienship.  Congress, in its act of 1866, pursuant to the 13th amendment, passed that which became, after the passage of the 14th Amendment, title 18, section 242, and passed civil liability statutes that dissolved state immunity for the same acts and allowed the officers of the state to be sued in their individual capacity for acts engaged outside of that law.

It is not sufficient to imply, either, that the due process for the individual is ended once trial is over.  Subsequent developments, affecting their rights, due to the past act, are punishments for that act. (Ex Parte garland).

New laws, only affecting the individual or class, in states outside of the jurisdiction of the original act are of like character.  The state cannot establish jurisdiction by demanding an individual do a thing, else be subject to criminal punishment.

The criminal failure to register is an act predicated entirely upon that prior act, and as such, constitutes a continued punishment for that act, for it is by that act that the determination of those upon whom the law will act is defined.  This is a forbidden power of congress.

Quote

The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that, in the pursuit of happiness, all avocations, all honors, all positions are alike open to everyone, and that in the protection  (Page 71 U. S. 322) of these rights all are equal before the law. Any deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punishment, and can be in no other wise defined.

Quote

“Whatever respect might have been felt for the State sovereignties, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the Constitution viewed with some apprehension the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment, and that the people of the United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed. The restrictions on the legislative power of the States are obviously founded in this sentiment, and the Constitution of the United States contains what may be deemed a bill of rights for the people of each State. “

Quote

“A British act of Parliament,” to cite the language of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, “might declare, that if certain individuals, or a class of individuals, failed to do a given act by a named day, they should be deemed to be, and treated as convicted felons or traitors. Such an act comes precisely within the definition of a bill of attainder, and the English courts would enforce it without indictment or trial by jury.

  Cummings v. Missouri.

It does not save the legislative enactment from infirmity, however, when the trial is merely upon the fact that the forbidden, or mandated act occurred or did not occur.  The infirmity is the mode of the identification, the naming of the group upon whom the law is to act.  It was a guarantee of general law long since abandoned by the states, and federal government.

Merely because, however, the right has lain fallow for over a century does not change the infirmity, or the power of the clause.

Quote

“What the state may not do directly it may not do indirectly. If it cannot punish the servant as a criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve without paying his debt, it is not permitted to accomplish the same result by creating a statutory presumption which, upon proof of no other fact, exposes him to conviction and punishment.

  Bailey v. Alabama 219 U.S. 219 (1911)

Both are forms of bills of pains and penalties, forbidden by that attainder clause.  Everything within the Constitutional bill of rights, in order to deprive it from a class, would constitute a bill of attainder.  The right to travel between states, and to have the jurisdiction of crimes remain within the original state, is a similar right.  It cannot be relieved by claiming through interstate compact that they may do the things collectively that they are forbidden individually.  It is a fundamental infirmity which may not be relieved by legislation nor by regulation… one of the original privileges and immunities to which the state is forbidden to act.

Congress, upon passage of that 1866 and 1871 civil rights acts, established a vesting of that right upon all persons within the states, territories, districts and possessions of this nation.  It was an absolute vesting, and a statement that the deprivation of those rights constituted a deprivation of vested property, and a criminal trespass against the individual.

Cruikshanks went around this by warping not only the intent of the law, but by distorting it so severely it took over a century to return it near its original mandate under McDonald v. Chicago, 2010, but even there it is incomplete as to the stated intent of those who wrote that fundamental law.

The Court upheld the intepretation of the original law in Screws v. Classic, and again in Monroe v. Pape, but apparently chose not to approach the initial definitions of privileges and immunities in those cases.

Quote

“The model for it will be found in the second section of the act of April 9, 1866, known as the ‘civil rights act.’ . . . This section of this bill, on the same state of facts, not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have been that of slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State law, they or any of them may be deprived of rights. . . . [Footnote 32]”

Thus, it is beyond doubt that this phrase should be accorded the same construction in both statutes — in § 1979 and in 18 U.S.C. § 242.

Monroe v. Pape.

 

Among those rights constitutional ly protected:

Quote

“Our cases have firmly established that the right of interstate travel is constitutional ly protected, does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well as governmental interference. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 -631; id., at 642-644 (concurring opinion); United States [403 U.S. 88, 106] v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 -760 and n. 17; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 ; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79-80; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 44, 48-49; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). The ‘right to pass freely from State to State’ has been explicitly recognized as ‘among the rights and privileges of National citizenship.’ Twining v. New Jersey, supra, at 97. That right, like other rights of national citizenship, is within the power of Congress to protect by appropriate legislation.” (105-6)

Griffin v. Breckenridge 403 U.S. 88 (1971)

Quote

“Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a “personal” right, whether the “property” in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependenc e exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized. J. Locke, Of Civil Government 82-85 (1924); J. Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in F. Coker, Democracy, Liberty, and Property 121-132 (1942); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *138-140. Congress recognized these rights in 1871 when it enacted the predecessor of 1983 and 1343 (3). We do no more than reaffirm the judgment of Congress today.” (552)

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 405 U.S. 538 (1972)

What congress did in that 1866 act, and reiterated in the 1871 act, was a vesting of those individual rights in all persons in every state, territory, district, or possession, and established means of vindicating those rights without regard to any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary.  They are personal property rights, and enforceable both under the criminal law, as well as the civil law pursuant to title 42, section 1983.  No state office can offer immunity to the criminal law issue.

Quote

“We do not perceive how holding an office under a State, and claiming to act for the State, can relieve the holder from obligation to obey the Constitution of the United States, or take away the power of Congress to punish his disobedience.. .It was insisted during the argument on behalf of the petitioner that Congress cannot punish a State judge for his official acts; and it was assumed that Judge Cole, in selecting the jury as he did, was performing a judicial act. This assumption cannot be admitted. Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent.” 

Ex Parte State of Va. 100 U.S. 339 (1879)

What has effectively been done is a dissolution of one of the highest powers of state sovereignty, the inability of other states to punish for crimes committed outside of their jurisdiction.  The initial crime was in the initial state, and there jurisdiction rests.  The receiving state has no authority to create legislation, due to the fact of a prior crime, in order to deprive the individual of fundamental rights.

Nor do they possess the power to compel an individual who is not on probation or parole, on threat of punishment, to divulge information or facts regarding their current whereabouts in order to make it public information, particularly under the threat of criminal punishment or deprivation of property.

Again, it is the mode of the determination that is infirm… the state has no power, even by the amendment of its own constitution, to accomplish this goal.

The determination on the fact of the prior criminal act makes the punitive selection obvious, that congress has designated a class as a danger to society, and established deprivations upon that class, and must compel that class by threat of criminal punishment to do those things which are detrimental to both their fundamental rights, and their privileges and immunities as citizens and inhabitants of these United States.

That these particular individual acts may be proven by public record makes the situation untenable.  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, acts of public record stand as valid evidence.  That a criminal act exists is undeniable pursuant to title 18, section 242.  That we have a right to the enforcement of that statute is also undeniable, as we are persons within that jurisdiction.  Pursuant to title 18, section 4 of that Code, individuals aware of a criminal act cognizable by the federal government must make that act known to individuals in civil or military authority.  Should the perpetrator of such an act not be pursued, it must be elevated, and the individual failing to bring the act, may be tried under title 18, sections 3 and 4, as well as the title 18, section 242 directly.  If they order that the law be not enforced, it is a title 18, section 2 evidence of being a principle to the act.

The courts cannot have jurisdiction where there is none, and jurisdiction is abandoned where criminal acts upon part of the court, or officers of the court, are raised.  Municipalities themselves are not immune to the act, being creatures of the state.

Quote

Moreover, the congressional debates surrounding the passage of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 — the forerunner of § 1983 — confirm the expansive sweep of the statutory

Page 445 U. S. 636

language. Representative Shellabarger, the author and manager of the bill in the House, explained in his introductory remarks the breadth of construction that the Act was to receive:

“I have a single remark to make in regard to the rule of interpretation of those provisions of the Constitution under which all the sections of the bill are framed. This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provision authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. It would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous, were this not the rule of interpretation . As has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people.”

name pro se

Street address

townNebraska

zip code

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

name pro se

spouse name

children’s name

children’s name

Plaintiffs,

 

vs

ADD NAMES HERE

1

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIV CASE NO._________________

 

Civil Complaint

 

 

Now comes the plaintiffs, Name and family and complaining of the Defendants,

ADD NAMES HERE

respectfully represents unto the Court as follows: That the Defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacity.

Presently nothing is pending in relationship to this lawsuit, in any other Court addressing the issues in this lawsuit.

COUNT I

1. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under the 1 Amendment 4th Amendment, 5th amendment, 8 Amendment, 9th Amendment, 10th Amendment and section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3 and Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution and Title 28, USCS §§1331 and 13343(3) and Title 42, USCS 1983, Title 42, USCS 1985 and Title 42, USCS 1988.

2. That the matter of controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000.00 exclusive of interest and cost.

3. During all times mentioned, and continuing up to the present date, the Plaintiff was, and still is a citizen of the U.S.

4. That the defendants; ________________________________________

_________________________-at all times and places herein mentioned, was duly appointed, qualified, and acting officers of the State of Nebraska, a municipal Corporation, and were agents of the State of Nebraska

5. That the Defendant; at all times and places herein mention, was a duly appointed ——————–and was an agent for the said department, and was acting pursuant to orders from her supervisors within the department of —————–.,and at times of the occurrence herein alleged was acting ————————– it was her duty to interview, investigate, and make recommendations toward clients assigned to her.

6.That the Defendant; ————– at all times and places herein mention, was a duly appointed Director ———————–and was an agent for the said department, and was acting pursuant to orders from his supervisors or director; name unknown within the department of —————.,and at times of the occurrence herein alleged was acting as a ——————— it was his duty to interview, investigate, supervise and make recommendations.

7. That the Defendant; ——————— at all times and places herein mention, was a duly appointed ———————– and was an agent for the said department, and was acting pursuant to orders from his supervisors or directors; name unknown within the ———————.,and at times of the occurrence herein alleged was acting as the ———————- it was her duty to interview, investigate, supervise and make recommendations.

8. That the Defendant; —————-, at all times and places herein mention, was a duly appointed —————————- ,and was acting pursuant to orders from his supervisors or directors; names unknown within the —————————-.,and at times of the occurrence herein alleged was acting as a member of the ——————————- it was his duty to interview, investigate, supervise and make recommendations.

COUNT II

1. nebraska statue 29-4000 is used to punish a class of person i.e. (sex offender / sexual addictions) and is punishing them more than other classes of people (sex offenders meet the requirements for a classification of persons (1) Sex offenders have suffered a history of discrimination, (2) there is no relationship to the defined characteristics of the group and their ability to participate in or contribute to society. (3) The characteristics were beyond the individuals control. (4) The group has a history of purposeful unequal treatment and been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. Thereby requiring protection under Equal protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Sex offender laws are quite obviously based on a prejudice and a desire to harm a politically unpopular person or persons and not out of a true need especially when sex offenders have one of the lowest re-offense rates. The laws form a base for vindictive prosecution and vindictive punishment because of the prejudice against sex crimes that is not justified by proof or hard evidence. “Mere negative attitudes, or fear of a given group, will not suffice as legitimate governmental purpose for legislation” and ” A bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group are not legitimate State interests”. City of Cleburne Tx. v. Cleburne Living Center 105 S.Ct. 3249. These laws have created two very defined classes (A) Sex offenders and (B) Non sex offenders, the non sex offenders have been allowed to lead lives without the interference of the government controlling their lives where the sex offenders lives are controlled and monitored for life. Sex offenders have no or little way to regain the classification of a non sex offender thereby the law has created a class, non sex offenders, giving it privilege and immunity that the other class dose not have and making it impossible for anyone in the sex offender class to regain the rights and privileges of a non sex offender. These laws are vague and overboard in that there is no thought to the seriousness, the dangerousness, to other crimes, or the amount of reformation. Statues may be considered Vague and overbroad Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may not permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows Police, Prosecutors, and Juries [or Judges] to pursue their personal predilections” Kolender v. Lawson 103 SCt.. 1855. This violates the First, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 14 Amendment of the Federal Constitution and the Nebraska Constitution

the plaintiff and his family have a liberty interest in COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION and they

calm that their family has been damage Libelous per se:

2. COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION IS A VIOLATION OF THE PLAINTIFF HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN’S 14^th AMEND RIGHTS (the state of Hawaii v. Bani In the supreme court of hawaii november 21 2001- – – the United States Supreme Court has previously recognized that a person’s reputation is a protected liberty interest under the federal due process clause. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (hereafter “Constantineau”); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (hereafter “Roth”).

In Constantineau, the State of Wisconsin authorized the posting of a notice prohibiting the sale or gift of liquor to any person who “‘by excessive drinking’ produces described conditions or exhibits specified traits, such as exposing himself or family ‘to want’ or becoming ‘dangerous to the peace’ of the community.” On appeal, the Constantineau Court recognized that “[i]t would be naive not to recognize that such ‘posting’ or characterization of an individual will expose him to public embarrassment and ridicule.” 400 U.S. at 436. The Court therefore held that a protectible liberty interest is implicated “[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him [or her.]” Id. at 437.

One year later, the Court again recognized a person’s liberty interest may be implicated by damage to his or her reputation. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. The plaintiff in Roth, a university professor, alleged that “the failure of University officials to give him notice of any reason for nonretention and an opportunity for a hearing violated his right to procedural due process of law.” Id. at 569. The Roth Court reasoned that, in declining to hire the plaintiff, the state had neither advanced “any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the community” nor “imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id. at 573. The Roth Court noted, however, that “a different case” would have been presented had the state either damaged the plaintiff’s reputation or imposed a stigma on him. Id. at 573-74.

However, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, reh’g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976), the Court clarified that “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is [n]either ‘liberty’ [n]or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 701. The plaintiff in Paul alleged a deprivation of liberty without due process of law after the circulation of flyers publicizing his conviction for shoplifting and labeling him an “active shoplifter.” Id. at 712. According to the Paul Court, because the plaintiff’s harm was not accompanied by the alteration of “a right or status previously recognized by state law,” there was no deprivation of a protectible liberty interest. Id. at 711-12.

Paul has been interpreted to require “stigma plus” in order to establish a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1994). In other words,

an allegation that government dissemination of information or government defamation has caused damage to reputation, even with all the attendant emotional anguish and social stigma, does not in itself state a cause of action for violation of a constitutional right; infringement of more ‘tangible interests’ . . . must be alleged as well.

Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Marshall v. University of Hawaii, 9 Haw. App. 21, 32, 821 P.2d 937, 948 (1991).

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Bani has shown substantial injury to both his reputation and other “tangible interests.” This case does not therefore require us to determine whether a person’s reputation alone constitutes a protected liberty interest under the Hawai`i Constitution. Suffice it to say that Bani has established that the public notification provisions of HRS chapter 846E implicate a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution.

First, Bani has demonstrated that the public notification provisions of HRS chapter 846E will likely cause harm to his reputation. The statute effectively brands Bani a “sex offender,” i.e., a public danger, for life. See Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafterPataki III]; Doe v. Attorney General, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (Mass. 1997) [hereinafter Doe II];see also Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1436 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).

Specifically, HRS chapter 846E’s public notification provisions imply that Bani is potentially dangerous, thereby undermining his reputation and standing in the community. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 419 (N.J. 1995); cf. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[o]ne need only look to the increasingly popular ‘Megan’s laws,’ whereby states require sex offenders to register with law enforcement officials who are then authorized to release information about the sex offender to the public, to comprehend the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex offender”). Indeed, public notification that Bani is a convicted sex offender implicitly announces that, in the eyes of the State, Bani presents a risk of committing another sex offense. Doe II, 686 N.E.2d at 144.

Second, Bani will foreseeably suffer serious harm to other “tangible interests” as a result of registration as a sex offender. Potential employers and landlords will foreseeably be reluctant to employ or rent to Bani once they learn of his status as a “sex offender.” See Pataki III, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468; W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1219 (D.N.J. 1996), rev’d, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998) [hereinafter Verniero]; see also In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (quoting In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1973)). ⁽⁸⁾ Indeed, the public disclosure provisions of HRS chapter 846E can adversely affect an offender’s personal and professional life, employability, associations with neighbors, and choice of housing. Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Or. 1998); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Alaska 1994), appeal dismissed, 85 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1996) (personal and professional lives); Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D.N.J. 1995),aff’d in part and vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.), reh’g denied, 83 F.2d 594 (1996) (employability and associations with neighbors); Robin L. Deems, Comment, California’s Sex Offender Notification Statute: A Constitutional Analysis, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 1195 (1996) (citing Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey’s Megan’s Law, 3 J. L. & Pol’y 569, 580-81 (1995)) (choice of housing). In addition, public disclosure may encourage vigilantism and may expose the offender to possible physical violence. ⁽⁹⁾See, e.g., Poritz, 662 A.2d at 430-31 (Stein, J., dissenting); Pataki I, 940 F. Supp. 603, 608-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1485 (W.D. Wash. 1997). Indeed,

[w]hen a government agency focuses its machinery on the task of determining whether a person should be labeled publicly as having a certain undesirable characteristic or belonging to a certain undesirable group, and that agency must by law gather and synthesize evidence outside the public record in making that determination, the interest of the person to be labeled goes beyond mere reputation. . . . [I]t is an interest in avoiding the social ostracism, loss of employment opportunities, and significant likelihood of verbal and, perhaps, even physical harassment likely to follow from designation.

Noble, 964 P.2d at 995-96. Therefore, HRS chapter 846E is highly likely to cause irreparable harm to the plantiffand his famliys reputation and professional life, employability, associations with neighbors, and choice of housing.

The Paul Court recognized that, in addition to the interests recognized by state law, “[t]here are other interests . . . protected not by virtue of their recognition by the law of a particular State but because they are guaranteed in one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which has been ‘incorporated’ into the Fourteenth Amendment.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 710 n.5. As an example, in Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1436 n.4, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found a protectible interest in reputation where the stigma of being identified as a child abuser was tied to the protectible interest in privacy and autonomy of family relationships. See also Poritz, 662 A.2d at 419 (holding that the stigma resulting from notification that petitioner was a sex offender was tied to the protectible interest in privacy inasmuch as he had an interest in his reputation); Neal, 131 F.3d at 830 (holding that Hawaii’s designating of prisoner as “sex offender” without hearing and requiring successful completion of treatment program as precondition for parole eligibility together implicated a liberty interest protected by the right to due process of law).

Under these circumstances, we are persuaded by the following considerations that Bani has a liberty interest protected by the Hawai`i Constitution that entitles him to procedural due process: (1) the public disclosure of accumulated and synthesized personal information that would not otherwise be easily available; (2) the potential harm to his personal and professional life; (3) the foreseeable harm to his reputation; and (4) the statutory branding of him as a public danger, i.e., as a sex offender. We note that the “interest cannot be captured in a single word or phrase. It is an interest in knowing when the government is moving against you and why it has singled you out for special attention. It is an interest in avoiding the secret machinations of a Star Chamber.” Noble, 964 P.2d at 995.)

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and the opportunity to be heard. Korean Buddhist Temple, 87 Hawai`i at 243, 953 P.2d at 1351; Price, 77 Hawai`i at 172, 883 P.2d at 633; Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 378, 773 P.2d at 261 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). However, we have repeatedly recognized that “[d]ue process is not a fixed concept requiring a specific procedural course in every situation.” Korean Buddhist Temple, 87 Hawai`i at 243, 953 P.2d at 1341 (citations omitted). Instead, “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. (citations omitted). To determine what procedural protections are required in a given case, we must balance the following factors (the Matthews factors):

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (quoting Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335); Korean Buddhist Temple, 87 Hawai`i at 243, 953 P.2d at 1341 (citations omitted).

 

The issue of dangerousness, excepting when arrested for a current crime, does not go before a judge and no hearing is held, no crime has been committed nor has one been charged, the sex offender is legislatively and publically declared dangerous to society, automatically! The sex offender is presumed guilty of a possible future crime, innocence is never an option!

The effects of the “dangerous labeling: Sex offenders’ legal status is changed and they are systematically denied a society by the very, construction and misconstruction, of the laws that govern society! Sex offenders, even though they have paid their debt according to society’s penal laws, and now are labeled an outcast ostracised from society, and subject to subtle denials without any legal recourse!

In Trop -v- Dulles 356 U.S. 86 (1958), as to denationalization (the act of depriving a citizen of national rights or status), the court said:

“We believe, as did Chief Judge Clark in the court below, that use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment. There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless. … In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.

This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The threat makes the punishment obnoxious. The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. In this country the Eighth Amendment forbids this to be done.”

The effect of today’s, constructions and misconstructions, of laws relating only to sex offenders (excluding all other crime types) is that, the sex offender is ostracised from society as is the stateless person!

3. These laws are in fact a Bill of Attainder in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. Sex offender regulations are further infirm, in that they violate the prohibition against Bills of Attainder. Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3, of the U. S. Constitution guarantees that “no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”Similarly, Article l, Section 10, provides that “[n]o state * * * shall pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts * * *.” A bill of attainder is a type of class legislation that imposes punitive burdens on a particular, legislatively determined group, without the benefit of a judicial proceeding. Here, persons previously convicted of a felony, who have already been punished for their convictions, are further punished by legislative fiat by being deprived of the reputation and liberty. The prohibition against Bills of Attainder is offended by this statutory scheme.

In England, the bill of attainder was a legislative act that would simply declare a person or group of persons guilty of a particular crime, usually treason, and sentence the person or group to death and forfeiture of estate. United States v. Brown, 381 US 437, 441, 85 SCt 1707, 14 LEd2d 484 (1965).

Bills of attainder and pains and penalties were commonly used during and after the Revolution to deprive Tories of their rights and property, or to banish them from the state altogether. Brown, 381 US, at 442.

While variable in form, they tended to have three common characteristics

Convictions and sentences were pronounced by the Legislative Branch of the government, instead of the judicial;

2. The sentence pronounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no previous law or fixed rule;

3. The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any such were made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence, or that of his counsel, and no recognized rule of evidence governed the inquiry.

States v. Lovett, 328 US 303, 317 n. 6, 66 SCt 1073 United, 90 LEd 1252 (1946), citing

Cummings v. Missouri, (Miller,. J., dissenting), 71 US (4 Wall.) 277, 18 LEd2d 356, 388 (1866).

Bills of attainder were bitterly condemned by the drafters of our constitution, including Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. Hamilton wrote

“Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into the principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disqualification, disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legislature. The dangerous consequences of this power are manifest. If the legislature can disenfranchise any number of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions, it may soon confine all the votes to a small number of partisans, and establish an aristocracy or an oligarchy; if it may banish at discretion all those whom particular circumstances render obnoxious, without hearing or trial, no man can be safe, nor know when he may be the innocent victim of a prevailing faction. The name of liberty applied to such a government would be a mockery of common sense.”

After the Civil War, bills of attainder were enacted in many states in attempts to deprive former rebels of civil rights. Typically these took the form of laws or constitutional provisions that required an oath that person had never supported the Confederacy in any way as a condition to the practice of a profession (Cummings v. Missouri, supra); admission to the bar (In Re Garland, 71 US (4 Wall.) 333, 18 LEd 366 (1867)); or access to the courts (Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 US (16 Wall.) 234, 21 LEd 276 (1872)). Large numbers of persons could not take such an oath without perjuring themselves, and were effectively barred from the access to the courts. In every case the acts were struck down as bills of attainder Later commentators concluded in no uncertain terns that legislative assumption of judicial power is most pernicious in the criminal law:

“Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor, is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases which the popular feeling is strongly excited–the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this mode.”

Brown, 381 US, at 445, quoting 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, at 536-537 (8th Ed. 1927) (emphasis added).

Thus the Bill of Attainder Clause not only was intended as one implementation of the general principle of fractionalized power, but also reflected the Framers’ belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task cf ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons

The Supreme Court has rejected the rigid application of any particular test to determine whether a challenged act is an unlawful Bill of Attainder”[T]he wide variation in form, purpose, and effect of ante-Constitutional bills of Attainder indicates that a proper scope of the bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance to contemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attempting to discern the reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it was designed to eliminate. The best available evidence, the writings of the architects of our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was not intended as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise cf the judicial function, or, more simply, trial by legislature.”

Brown, id., at 442

In that spirit, while the quadripartite test of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425, 97 SO 2777, 53 LEd2d 867 (1977), was not meant to be rigidly formulaic, its

consideration is instructive. First, the challenged measure must be viewed in an historical context, to determine if, indeed, the subject of the measure is punitive. “Punishment,” of course, is not limited to deprivation of life, liberty or property. Cummings, 71 US (4 Wall.), at 323. The Court in Nixon noted that “a legislative enactment barring designated individuals or groups from participation” in otherwise available employments and activities is clearly punitive. Id., at 474. See Carter, supra.

Secondly, the Court approaches the question functionally, seeking to determine if the “law can be reasonably said to further nonpunitive goals, given the type and severity of the burdens imposed.” Rotunda, Nowak and Young, Constitutional Law 3d, at 395, citing Nixon, supra, at 475. For instance, an act is a bill of attainder if bars former Communists from serving on labor union boards simply because Congress regards them of having been guilty of subversive, albeit not illegal, acts, viz., belonging to an organization. Brown, supra, at 460. On the other hand, taking away federal student financial aid from men who had not registered for the draft was held not to be punishment because of the need to allocate scarce resources to men who showed they deserved the aid of their country by having registered for the draft. Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Research Group, 468 US 841, 104 SCt 3348, 82 LEd2d 632 (1984).’

‘ Cases since Lovett, supral, have discussed the significance of whether a mechanism exists whereby members of the affected group can avoid the law’s effect: if there are no means whereby members of the group can control whether they come within the scope of the law, then the law is more likely to be found to be a bill of attainder. See, e.g., Selective Service System, supra (cutting off student financial aid to persons who had not registered for the draft not singling out ascertainable group where Congress allowed for late registration to cure taint and escape effects of law).

Here, there is no satisfactory method for a person excluded from society by the taint of a sexual conviction to remove himself from the excluded category. For one thing, it is impossible for an individual who has been convicted of a sex crime to un-convict himself with any degree of certitude. A motion to set aside may be available and relatively simple but lengthy process, that, in any case, is only available to some felonies – the granting of which is subject to conditions, prosecutorial objection and judicial discretion. Or the conviction may overturned on appeal or post-conviction relief, neither of which is likely, nor Closely coupled with this issue is the legislative motivation, viz., is there a legislative intent to punish? Id., at 478. Here, the express purpose of the Nebraska sex offender law 29-4002 –The Legislature finds that sex offenders present a high risk to commit repeat offenses The Legislature further finds that efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, conduct investigations, and quickly apprehend sex offenders are impaired by the lack of available information about individuals who have pleaded guilty to or have been found guilty of sex offenses and who live, work, or attend school in their jurisdiction. The Legislature further finds that state policy should assist efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect their communities by requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies as provided by the Sex Offender Registration Act

Thus, the goal of the legislation in question itself is of suspect legitimacy, particularly in light of the “fundamental fairness” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and in a statistical sense, the state implies that sex offenders are likely to have a higher reoffence rate and be the cause of most if not all new offences . The problem is that the government has taken a large step toward establishing an ideological litmus test that all persons convicted of sex crimes will reoffend, the result of which is the elimination the possibility that new offences are by different persons the problem is that in the studies done by the united states dept, of justice and others have found that the sex offender reoffence rate is not only low but very low.

Some of the studies

US Department of Health and Human Services, Administration on Children, Youth and

Families. (2005). Child Maltreatment 2003 (Washington DC: USGPO, Online Summary:

US Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sex Offenders and Offenses, January through February 1997. NCJ163392

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2000). Sexual Assault of Young

Children as Reported to Law Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics. NCJ 182990

US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, (Oct. 2002). NISMART-2, Bulletin.

Nonfamily Abducted Children: National Estimates and Characteristics (pg.2)

US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, (Oct. 2002). NISMART-2, Bulletin.

In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed the “Elizabeth Morgan Act,” Dr. Elizabeth Morgan being the mother of Hilary a/k/a Ellen Morgan, a child born to her and Dr.

Eric Foretich, whom she has been accusing of child abuse for the past 20 years. This Bill denied Foretich even supervised visitation with Hilary. On December 16, 2003 the U.S. the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that Congress had passed an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder for, by denying even supervised visitation where no abuse could occur, the legislature had labeled him a sex offender and punished him as such. (Foretich v. United States (DC Cir, 2003)).

Since this is not a legitimate legislative goal, there can be no “rational and fairminded” and “less burdensome alternative… by which [the] legislature could have achieved its legitimate non-punitive objectives.” Nixon, supra, at 482. The legislation fails the fourth part of the Nixon test. Thus SB 936 §§8 and 9(b) violate the prohibition against Bills of Attainder in Article 1, §10 of the United States Constitution and cannot apply to the cause herein.

4. THE HEARING PROCESS IS IN VIOLATION OF THE 14^TH ADMEN. EVEN A PERSON THAT IS MENTAL ILL IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL AND MUST BE PROVEN MENTAL ILL BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ( DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PROHIBITS CRIMINAL STATUES FROM SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON TO THE DEFENDANT, PROHIBITS PUNISHMENT OF WHOLLY PASSIVE CONDUCT, —AND REQUIRES THAT STATUES MUST GIVE FAIR WARNING OF PROHIBITED CONDUCT – STEPIEWSKI V. GAGNON, 732 F.2D 567)

that the Plaintiff is a member of a group that has and continues to suffer from bias, prejudice and misinformation. and that laws and rules based on such, violate the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

violating his First and 8th Amendment rights under the Federal Constitution. “the loss of liberty is more then a loss of freedom from confinement. while a conviction and sentence extinguish an individuals right to freedom from confinement…they do not authorize the state to classify him as mentally ill (Vitek v. Jones cite as 100 S. Ct.1254(1980))

5. the plaintiff was classified as a level 3 offender with out a hearing to present his side and the facts of why he should not be so classified THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FOR FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS IS INACCURATE AND BASED ON PRESUMPTIONS AND THEORYS OF ONE PERSONS THERAPY MODELS NOT ON THE REAL STATISTICS (SEE BAREFOOT V. ESTELLE 463 US 880, 77 ED 2D 1090,103 S CT 3383) (THE COURT ASSUMED THAT —- HAS PROTECTIBLE INTEREST NOT ONLY TO BE FREE FROM UNNECESSARY BODILY RESTRAINTS BUT ALSO IN NOT BEING LABELED ERRONEOUSLY –PARHAM V. J.R. 99 S,CT. 2493 (1979))

6. USING A SCORE CARD TO EVALUATE A PERSONS LIBERTY INTEREST IS A VIOLATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE 14^TH AMEND. (THE CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES HIGHER VALUES THEN SPEED AND EFFICIENCY – STANLEY V. ILLINOIS – 92 S. CT 1208 (1972))

The risk assessment guide was made up by one person and he used his personal bias, prejudice and misinformation and not the statically facts to create the guide.

(a)The statically data on recidivism showed that 97 to 99 percent of all convicted sexoffenders are Not re-offending. It also indicated that 3 to 1 percent of convicted sex offenders have re-offended.

Thus, there is a small but important percentage of convicted sex offenders that

reoffend.

These offenders would be considered the high-risk group.

Fisher and Thornton (1993) observed that there are ‘a relatively large number of

offenders who offend at a low rate, perhaps even just once, and a smaller

number who offend at a relatively high rate‘ . Amongst this latter group will

be men whose reoffences are both frequent and severe. Treating all sex offenders as if they fall into the high-risk group is not effective because it wastes resources focusing on a large group of relatively harmless people, instead of concentrating resources on a small group of very dangerous people. But how can this highrisk group be identified? Research has been done to identify the people most likely to reoffend. These research findings are discussed below.

It is important to understand is that there are so many sex offender laws that do not actually pertain to actual ‘sex offenses’, and there are different kinds of sex offenses and thus different kinds of sex offenders, and their recidivism rates are not all alike. The rates vary with the offender’s prior criminal history, the offender’s age and sex, the length of time since the person was released from prison, and type of crime committed, and other factors. R. Karl Hanson, a recognized expert in the field of sex offenders, conducted a study showing that:

…most sexual offenders do not re-offend sexually, that first-time sexual offenders are significantly less likely to sexually re-offend than those with previous sexual convictions, and that offenders over the age of 50 are less likely to re-offend than younger offenders. In addition, it was found that the longer offenders remained offence-free in the community the less likely they are to re-offend sexually.

The risk of recidivism is also reflected in the type of crime committed. Factors related

to the type of crime include: whether the sex crime was committed against an adult or

a child, whether the victim was of the same sex or the opposite sex, whether threats, weapons or violence were used, whether the victim was a family member or not, and whether the victim was known or unknown to the assailant. The type of crime is one if the strongest predictors of the potential of the perpetrator to commit future sex crimes.

Data from the Hanson study shows that “rapists, incest offenders, ‘girl-victim’ child molesters, and ‘boy-victim’ child molesters recidivate at significantly different rates. These results challenge some commonly held beliefs about sexual recidivism and have implications for policies designed to manage the risk posed by convicted sexual offenders.”

Experts agree that there are different types of offenders in the continuum and that they have different characteristics and issues; they also tend to recidivate at different rates. Table C lists the primary categories. Other categories exist, such as pornography roduction and child prostitute solicitation but they are not listed in this categorization.

These categories are significant because they each have unique issues that do not span the entire continuum. For example, rapists tend to have psychological issues with anger, power and control; their crimes are not usually sexually motivated. Intra-familial offenders tend to offend at times of great stress or family dysfunction; they also tend to have the lowest recidivism rates of all categories. Extra-familial child molesters have greater scope of psychological issues and tend to have deeper-seated sexual deviant tendencies. In that last category, those who molest boys outside the family tend to have the highest recidivism rate of all; they are the ‘fixated pedophiles.’ It seems they, in general, typically are non-violent, and have a very hard time breaking through their denial to be able to understand that what they have done (although non-violent) is harmful and hurt the child. They are the least contrite and the most likely to reoffend. Table D illustrates this breakdown.

The plaintiff falls under the category of intra familial incest with no threats or weapons has be out of prison for over 10 years and is over 55 years old

(b) studies have shown that therapists are not good at coming with good programs or predicting future dangerousness In the J.J. Peters 10 year follow-up report where the psychiatrist rated the members of the treatment group and then later their arrest records were looked into. The ones rated best re-offended at 50%, those second best at 69.8%, and those that the psychiatrist rated as doing worst in their therapy re-offended at 35%. Research studies evaluating the effectiveness of current politically and socially acceptable treatment programs. Studies researching Behavior Modification programs that are approved and mandated by the courts, the board of prisons and probation officers and implemented by State Hospitals verified recidivism rates across the country. The (1989) Furby, Weinrott, and Blackshaw study of these studies being the most extensive and meticulously analytical. The studies found that offenders placed on probation with NO therapy are the least likely to re-offend. Offenders sent to jail or Prison also WITHOUT THERAPY are rated second least likely to re-offend. But those who are mandated, volunteer (under threat of prison or jail time) or are sentenced to Behavior Modification therapy are at least twice and as much as ten times as likely to re-offend in the committing of a new sex crime, and will commit other types of violent crimes at unreasonable rates as well. In the George Dix (1976) study, those who had been imprisoned and not treated, only 7.3% were convicted of subsequent sex offense and none of a subsequent non-sex offense. Those who had treatment were reconvicted at a rate of 16.7% for a subsequent sex offense and 12.5% of a subsequent non-sex related offense. That is a conviction rate of 7.3% without treatment and 29.2% with treatment. when Furby looked at 24 exceptionaly accrete North American study’s with 9957 sex offenders, 5292 with treatment and 4665 with out. The treated ones committed a new sex offense at 20.3% while only 5.6% of the ones without treatment committed another sex offense. The reconviction rate for other types of crimes was 12.3% for untreated and 30.8% for those with treatment. That is a total reoffence rate of 51.1% for those treated and 17.9% for those without treatment

Robyn M. Dawes in his book House of Cards “Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth”, stated “A person who claims that a treatment is effective must demonstrate that it has an effect in comparison to a hypothetical counterfactual, obtained through construction of a randomly constituted control group.” Such randomized experiments are very necessary in evaluating treatments for emotional disorders and one of the best is what is called a “Wait List Control”. This was used in the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative study from 1984 the people who had completed treatment re-offended in a sex crime at 13.6% and other crimes at 18.6%. Those who did not complete treatment at 6.5% for sex offense and 12.9% for other crimes and those that were on the list, but did not get into treatment re-offended in sex crimes at 5% and other crimes at 0%. The more the treatment, the more the criminal activity!

On page 20 of the “sex Offenders in Oregon” the statement is made “Most studies nationally reported rates ranging from 27.6% to 41.0% for subsequent offense.” They did not point out that those numbers are only for persons in treatment. The jacks study in 1962 looked into non-treated offenders showed the re-offense rate of 3.7% over 15 years that’s 2/10 of one percent per year, this must be used as the base line set as laid out by Robyn Dawes, any treatment program with a reoffence rate higher then 3.7% for a 15 year period must be consider a failure of the program not the individuals in it.

During September 1998, the Research Unit of the Arizona Department of Corrections. (ADC) completed an analysis of sex offenders released from ADC custody over the ten-year period from July 1988 through June 1998.

2,444 sex offenders were released from ADC custody over the ten-year period. The average period of follow-up (to June 30, 1998) for all sex offenders was 54.5 months. While sex offenders returned to prison for a variety of new crimes, 78 of the 2,444 or 3.2% returned for a new felony sex offense in ten years. Data collected from the Nebraska State patrol registry in 2012 showed that in 16 years the registry had increased in size 776%, while people on the registry whose crimes go back as far as 40 years, have a yearly re-offense rate of 2/1000 of 1%. And since the inception of the registry in Nebraskan the yearly re-offense rate has never been more than 1% per year studies done in Ohio tracked people that were on the registry for 10 years, and they found that the reconnection rate in a new sex crime. Over that 10 year period for people on the registry had a yearly average of 3/10 of one percent and at one point got down to four one hundredths of one percent the 1997 Department of Justice study found that out of the 187,132 new sex offenses within the three years of the study that sex offenders were involved in 27/1000 of 1% of the new sex crimes

7. the sex offender laws are also a violation of the special legislative provision of the Nebraska constitution (A legislative act can violate this provision as special legislation in one of two ways:

(1.) by creating a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification, or

(2.) by creating a permanently closed class. Haman v. Marsh, 237

8. The State and towns in the state have passed a set of laws, rules and ordinances that are stricter against sex offenders. Seeking to punish these persons by denying them places to work, places to live and places to have recreation A loss of freedom of choice in their and their families lives, punishing this group of persons who have been involved in a sexual offenses beyond their standard time in prison on parole and post prison supervision then is there for other types offenses. Sex offenders are a class of person they have protection under the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution and it is being violated by these laws.

9. The use of Nebraska Statue 29-4002 are violations of the Plaintiffs First, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, and of the due process and equal protection clauses of 14th Amendment Rights The use of it against the Plaintiff is a violation of the Ex post facto clause of both the State and Federal Constitutions in that the laws did not go in to effect till long after the crimes. The Ex Post Facto Cluse not only ensures that indivduals have “fair warning” about the effect of criminal statutes, but also “restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentily vindictive legislation” Weaver v. Graham 101 S.Ct. @ 960, 963- 964. The prohibitions on “bills of Attainder” in Art. I §§ 9-10 cl. prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct Landgrar v. usi film products 114 S.Ct @1497. These laws act as Bills of Attainders in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. Some of these laws are a violation of the Nondelegation doctrine by not defining proper rules definitions and safe guards THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT SPELL OUT IN CLEAR STATUE HOW THE EVALUATION AND HEARING PHASE WOULD BE HANDLED THEY PAST IT ON TO THE STATE PATROL THEREBY VIOLATING THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY DOCTRINE (U.S. V. GARFINKEL 29 F.3D. 451 (8^TH CIR 1994))

. the sex offender laws are vague and overboard in that there is no thought to the seriousness, the dangerousness, to other crimes, or the amount of reformation. Statues may be considered Vague and overbroad Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may not permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows Police, Prosecutors, and Juries [or Judges] to pursue their personal predilections” Kolender v. Lawson 103 SCt.. 1855.

10. By notifying the community the plaintiff and his family with have suffered segregation and threats from the community This is a violation of his and his familys First amendment rights of freedom of association, thought, religion, speech, and assemble as well as violating 8th, 9th, 10th, and 14th Amendment Rights of the Federal Constitution and as well as the Nebraska Constitution.

Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive constitutional review resting on a theory of unenumerated rights occurred largely in the state courts applying state constitutions that commonly contained either due process clauses like that of the Fifth Amendment (and later the Fourteenth) or the textual antecedents of such clauses, repeating Magna Carta’s guarantee of “the law of the land.” http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-110.ZC2.html – FN5^[n.5] On the basis of such clauses, or of general principles untethered to specific constitutional language, state courts evaluated the constitutionality of a wide range of statutes.

Thus, a Connecticut court approved a statute legitimating a class of previous illegitimate marriages, as falling within the terms of the “social compact,” while making clear its power to review constitutionality in those terms. Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 225-226 (1822). In the same period, a specialized court of equity, created under a Tennessee statute solely to hear cases brought by the state bank against its debtors, found its own authorization unconstitutional as “partial” legislation violating the state constitution’s “law of the land” clause. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599, 602-608 (Tenn. 1831) (Green, J.); id., at 613-615 (Peck, J.); id., at 618-623 (Kennedy, J.). And the middle of the 19th century brought the famous Wynehamer case, invalidating a statute purporting to render possession of liquor immediately illegal except when kept for narrow, specified purposes, the state court finding the statute inconsistent with the state’s due process clause. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 486-487 (1856). The statute was deemed an excessive threat to the “fundamental rights of the citizen” to property. Id., at 398 (Comstock, J.). See generally, E. Corwin, Liberty Against Government 58-115 (1948) (discussing substantive due process in the state courts before the Civil War); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *85-*129, *351-*397.

Even in this early period, however, this Court anticipated the developments that would presage both the Civil War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, by making it clear on several occasions that it too had no doubt of the judiciary’s power to strike down legislation that conflicted with important but unenumerated principles of American government. In most such instances, after declaring its power to invalidate what it might find inconsistent with rights of liberty and property, the Court nevertheless went on to uphold the legislative acts under review. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 656-661 (1829); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 386-395 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); see also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 550-552 (No. 3,230) (1823). But in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810), the Court went further. It struck down an act of the Georgia legislature that purported to rescind a sale of public land ab initio and reclaim title for the State, and so deprive subsequent, good faith purchasers of property conveyed by the original grantees. The Court rested the invalidation on alternative sources of authority: the specific prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post-facto laws, laws impairing contracts in Article I, § 10 of the Constitution; and “general principles which are common to our free institutions,” by which Chief Justice Marshall meant that a simple deprivation of property by the State could not be an authentically “legislative” act. Fletcher, 6 Cranch, at 135-139.

Fletcher was not, though, the most telling early example of such review. For its most salient instance in this Court before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was, of course, the case that the Amendment would in due course overturn, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). Unlike Fletcher, Dred Scott was textually based on a due process clause (in the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the national government), and it was in reliance on that clause’s protection of property that the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise. 19 How., at 449-452. This substantive protection of an owner’s property in a slave taken to the territories was traced to the absence of any enumerated power to affect that property granted to the Congress by Article I of the Constitution, id., at 451-452, the implication being that the government had no legitimate interest that could support the earlier congressional compromise. The ensuing judgment of history needs no recounting here.

After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, with its guarantee of due process protection against the States, interpretation of the words “liberty” and “property” as used in due process clauses became a sustained enterprise, with the Court generally describing the due process criterion in converse terms of reasonableness or arbitrariness. That standard is fairly traceable to Justice Bradley’s dissent in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873), in which he said that a person’s right to choose a calling was an element of liberty (as the calling, once chosen, was an aspect of property) and declared that the liberty and property protected by due process are not truly recognized if such rights may be “arbitrarily assailed,” id., at 116. http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-110.ZC2.html – FN6^[n.6] After that, opinions comparable to those that preceded Dred Scott expressed willingness to review legislative action for consistency with the Due Process Clause even as they upheld the laws in question. See, e.g., Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 133-135 (1874); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123-135 (1877); Railroad Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 659-670 (1887). See generally Corwin, Liberty Against Government, at 121-136 (surveying the Court’s early Fourteenth Amendment cases and finding little dissent from the general principle that the Due Process Clause authorized judicial review of substantive statutes).

The theory became serious, however, beginning with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), where the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute for excessive interference with Fourteenth Amendment liberty to contract, id., at 588-593, and offered a substantive interpretation of “liberty,” that in the aftermath of the so called Lochner Era has been scaled back in some respects, but expanded in others, and never repudiated in principle. The Court said that Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes “the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.” Id., at 589. “[W]e do not intend to hold that in no such case can the State exercise its police power,” the Court added, but “[w]hen and how far such power may be legitimately exercised with regard to these subjects must be left for determination to each case as it arises.” Id., at 590.

Although this principle was unobjectionable, what followed for a season was, in the realm of economic legislation, the echo of Dred Scott. Allgeyer was succeeded within a decade by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and the era to which that case gave its name, famous now for striking down as arbitrary various sorts of economic regulations that post-New Deal courts have uniformly thought constitutionally sound. Compare, e.g., id., at 62 (finding New York’s maximum hours law for bakers “unreasonable and entirely arbitrary”) and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C., 261 U.S. 525, 559 (1923) (holding a minimum wage law “so clearly the product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of power that it cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution of the United States”) with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (overruling Adkins and approving a minimum wage law on the principle that “regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process”). As the parentheticals here suggest, while the cases in the Lochner line routinely invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness review, they harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation of the standard they espoused.

Even before the deviant economic due process cases had been repudiated, however, the more durable precursors of modern substantive due process were reaffirming this Court’s obligation to conduct arbitrariness review, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Without referring to any specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights, the Court invoked precedents from the Slaughter House Cases through Adkins to declare that the Fourteenth Amendment protected “the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Id., at 399. The Court then held that the same Fourteenth Amendment liberty included a teacher’s right to teach and the rights of parents to direct their children’s education without unreasonable interference by the States, id., at 400, with the result that Nebraska’s prohibition on the teaching of foreign languages in the lower grades was, “arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State,” id., at 403. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-536 (1925) (finding that a statute that all but outlawed private schools lacked any “reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State”); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327-238 (1937) (“even in the field of substantive rights and duties the legislative judgment, if oppressive and arbitrary, may be overridden by the courts”; “Is that [injury] to which the statute has subjected [the appellant] a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions?”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

After Meyer and Pierce, two further opinions took the major steps that lead to the modern law. The first was not even in a due process case but one about equal protection, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), where the Court emphasized the “fundamental” nature of individual choice about procreation and so foreshadowed not only the later prominence of procreation as a subject of liberty protection, but the corresponding standard of “strict scrutiny,” in this Court’s Fourteenth Amendment law. See id., at 541. Skinner, that is, added decisions regarding procreation to the list of liberties recognized in Meyer and Pierce and loosely suggested, as a gloss on their standard of arbitrariness, a judicial obligation to scrutinize any impingement on such an important interest with heightened care. In so doing, it suggested a point that Justice Harlan would develop, that the kind and degree of justification that a sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on the importance of the interest being asserted by the individual. Poe, 367 U. S., at 543.

The second major opinion leading to the modern doctrine was Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent just cited, the conclusion of which was adopted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 478 (1965), and the authority of which was acknowledged in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also n. 4, supra. The dissent is important for three things that point to our responsibilities today. The first is Justice Harlan’s respect for the tradition of substantive due process review itself, and his acknowledgement of the Judiciary’s obligation to carry it on. For two centuries American courts, and for much of that time this Court, have thought it necessary to provide some degree of review over the substantive content of legislation under constitutional standards of textual breadth. The obligation was understood before Dred Scott and has continued after the repudiation of Lochner‘s progeny, most notably on the subjects of segregation in public education, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), interracial marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), marital privacy and contraception, Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-691 (1977), Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 481-486, abortion, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 869-879 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-166 (1973), personal control of medical treatment, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-289 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id., at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id., at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id., at 278 (majority opinion), and physical confinement, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-83 (1992). This enduring tradition of American constitutional practice is, in Justice Harlan’s view, nothing more than what is required by the judicial authority and obligation to construe constitutional text and review legislation for conformity to that text. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Like many judges who preceded him and many who followed, he found it impossible to construe the text of due process without recognizing substantive, and not merely procedural, limitations. “Were due process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three.” Poe, 367 U. S., at 541. http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-110.ZC2.html – FN7^[n.7] The text of the Due Process Clause thus imposes nothing less than an obligation to give substantive content to the words “liberty” and “due process of law.”

Following the first point of the Poe dissent, on the necessity to engage in the sort of examination we conduct today, the dissent’s second and third implicitly address those cases, already noted, that are now condemned with virtual unanimity as disastrous mistakes of substantive due process review. The second of the dissent’s lessons is a reminder that the business of such review is not the identification of extratextual absolutes but scrutiny of a legislative resolution (perhaps unconscious) of clashing principles, each quite possibly worthy in and of itself, but each to be weighed within the history of our values as a people. It is a comparison of the relative strengths of opposing claims that informs the judicial task, not a deduction from some first premise. Thus informed, judicial review still has no warrant to substitute one reasonable resolution of the contending positions for another, but authority to supplant the balance already struck between the contenders only when it falls outside the realm of the reasonable. Part III, below, deals with this second point, and also with the dissent’s third, which takes the form of an object lesson in the explicit attention to detail that is no less essential to the intellectual discipline of substantive due process review than an understanding of the basic need to account for the two sides in the controversy and to respect legislation within the zone of reasonableness.

My understanding of unenumerated rights in the wake of the Poe dissent and subsequent cases avoids the absolutist failing of many older cases without embracing the opposite pole of equating reasonableness with past practice described at a very specific level. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-849 (1992). That understanding begins with a concept of “ordered liberty,” Poe, 367 U. S., at 549 (Harlan, J.); see also Griswold, 381 U. S., at 500, comprising a continuum of rights to be free from “arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,” Poe, 367 U. S., at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

“Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.” Id., at 542.

See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) (“Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful `respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society’ “) (quoting Griswold, 481 U. S., at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

After the Poe dissent, as before it, this enforceable concept of liberty would bar statutory impositions even at relatively trivial levels when governmental restraints are undeniably irrational as unsupported by any imaginable rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (economic legislation “not . . . unconstitutional unless . . . facts . . . preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis”); see also Poe, 367 U. S., at 545, 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to usual “presumption of constitutionality” and ordinary test “going merely to the plausibility of [a statute’s] underlying rationale”). Such instances are suitably rare. The claims of arbitrariness that mark almost all instances of unenumerated substantive rights are those resting on “certain interests requir[ing] particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma [ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)]; Bolling v. Sharpe, [347 U.S. 497 (1954)],” id., at 543; that is, interests in liberty sufficiently important to be judged “fundamental,” id., at 548; see also id., at 541 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380 (CC ED Pa. 1825)). In the face of an interest this powerful a State may not rest on threshold rationality or a presumption of constitutionality, but may prevail only on the ground of an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the realm of the reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right asserted. Poe, supra, at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (an “enactment involv[ing] . . . a most fundamental aspect of `liberty’ . . . [is] subjec[t] to `strict scrutiny’ “) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S., at 541); http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-110.ZC2.html – FN8^[n.8] Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993) (reaffirming that due process “forbids the government to infringe certain `fundamental’ liberty interests . . . unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”). http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-110.ZC2.html – FN9^[n.9]

This approach calls for a court to assess the relative “weights” or dignities of the contending interests, and to this extent the judicial method is familiar to the common law. Common law method is subject, however, to two important constraints in the hands of a court engaged in substantive due process review. First, such a court is bound to confine the values that it recognizes to those truly deserving constitutional stature, either to those expressed in constitutional text, or those exemplified by “the traditions from which [the Nation] developed,” or revealed by contrast with “the traditions from which it broke.” Poe, 367 U. S., at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). ” `We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits . . . derived from considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process . . .[,] considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession.’ ” Id., at 544-545 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-171 (1952)); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 325 (looking to ” `principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’ “) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).

The second constraint, again, simply reflects the fact that constitutional review, not judicial lawmaking, is a court’s business here. The weighing or valuing of contending interests in this sphere is only the first step, forming the basis for determining whether the statute in question falls inside or outside the zone of what is reasonable in the way it resolves the conflict between the interests of state and individual. See, e.g., Poe, supra, at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-321 (1982). It is no justification for judicial intervention merely to identify a reasonable resolution of contending values that differs from the terms of the legislation under review. It is only when the legislation’s justifying principle, critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must give way. Only if this standard points against the statute can the individual claimant be said to have a constitutional right. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S., at 279 (“[D]etermining that a person has a `liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; `whether [the individual’s] constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests’ “) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, at 321). http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-110.ZC2.html – FN10^[n.10]

The Poe dissent thus reminds us of the nature of review for reasonableness or arbitrariness and the limitations entailed by it. But the opinion cautions against the repetition of past error in another way as well, more by its example than by any particular statement of constitutional method: it reminds us that the process of substantive review by reasoned judgment, Poe, 367 U. S., at 542-544, is one of close criticism going to the details of the opposing interests and to their relationships with the historically recognized principles that lend them weight or value.

Although the Poe dissent disclaims the possibility of any general formula for due process analysis (beyond the basic analytic structure just described), see id., at 542, 544, Justice Harlan of course assumed that adjudication under the Due Process Clauses is like any other instance of judgment dependent on common law method, being more or less persuasive according to the usual canons of critical discourse. See also Casey, 505 U. S., at 849 (“The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment”). When identifying and assessing the competing interests of liberty and authority, for example, the breadth of expression that a litigant or a judge selects in stating the competing principles will have much to do with the outcome and may be dispositive. As in any process of rational argumentation, we recognize that when a generally accepted principle is challenged, the broader the attack the less likely it is to succeed. The principle’s defenders will, indeed, often try to characterize any challenge as just such a broadside, perhaps by couching the defense as if a broadside attack had occurred. So the Court in Dred Scott treated prohibition of slavery in the Territories as nothing less than a general assault on the concept of property. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., at 449-452.

Just as results in substantive due process cases are tied to the selections of statements of the competing interests, the acceptability of the results is a function of the good reasons for the selections made. It is here that the value of common law method becomes apparent, for the usual thinking of the common law is suspicious of the all or nothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification instead of an evolving boundary between the domains of old principles. Common law method tends to pay respect instead to detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new examples and new counterexamples. The “tradition is a living thing,” Poe, 367 U. S., at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting), albeit one that moves by moderate steps carefully taken. “The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take its place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.” Id., at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exact analysis and characterization of any due process claim is critical to the method and to the result.

So, in Poe, Justice Harlan viewed it as essential to the plaintiffs’ claimed right to use contraceptives that they sought to do so within the privacy of the marital bedroom. This detail in fact served two crucial and complementary functions, and provides a lesson for today. It rescued the individuals’ claim from a breadth that would have threatened all state regulation of contraception or intimate relations; extramarital intimacy, no matter how privately practiced, was outside the scope of the right Justice Harlan would have recognized in that case. See id., at 552-553. It was, moreover, this same restriction that allowed the interest to be valued as an aspect of a broader liberty to be free from all unreasonable intrusions into the privacy of the home and the family life within it, a liberty exemplified in constitutional provisions such as the Third and Fourth Amendments, in prior decisions of the Court involving unreasonable intrusions into the home and family life, and in the then prevailing status of marriage as the sole lawful locus of intimate relations. Id., at 548, 551. http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-110.ZC2.html – FN11^[n.11] The individuals’ interest was therefore at its peak in Poe, because it was supported by a principle that distinguished of its own force between areas in which government traditionally had regulated (sexual relations outside of marriage) and those in which it had not (private marital intimacies), and thus was broad enough to cover the claim at hand without being so broad as to be shot through by exceptions.

On the other side of the balance, the State’s interest in Poe was not fairly characterized simply as preserving sexual morality, or doing so by regulating contraceptive devices. Just as some of the earlier cases went astray by speaking without nuance of individual interests in property or autonomy to contract for labor, so the State’s asserted interest in Poe was not immune to distinctions turning (at least potentially) on the precise purpose being pursued and the collateral consequences of the means chosen, see id., at 547-548. It was assumed that the State might legitimately enforce limits on the use of contraceptives through laws regulating divorce and annulment, or even through its tax policy, ibid., but not necessarily be justified in criminalizing the same practice in the marital bedroom, which would entail the consequence of authorizing state enquiry into the intimate relations of a married couple who chose to close their door, id., at 548-549. See also Casey, 505 U. S., at 869 (strength of State’s interest in potential life varies depending on precise context and character of regulation pursuing that interest).

The same insistence on exactitude lies behind questions, in current terminology, about the proper level of generality at which to analyze claims and counter claims, and the demand for fitness and proper tailoring of a restrictive statute is just another way of testing the legitimacy of the generality at which the government sets up its justification. http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-110.ZC2.html – FN12^[n.12] We may therefore classify Justice Harlan’s example of proper analysis in any of these ways: as applying concepts of normal critical reasoning, as pointing to the need to attend to the levels of generality at which countervailing interests are stated, or as examining the concrete application of principles for fitness with their own ostensible justifications. But whatever the categories in which we place the dissent’s example, it stands in marked contrast to earlier cases whose reasoning was marked by comparatively less discrimination, and it points to the importance of evaluating the claims of the parties now before us with comparable detail. For here we are faced with an individual claim not to a right on the part of just anyone to help anyone else commit suicide under any circumstances, but to the right of a narrow class to help others also in a narrow class under a set of limited circumstances. And the claimants are met with the State’s assertion, among others, that rights of such narrow scope cannot be recognized without jeopardy to individuals whom the State may concededly protect through its regulations.

No were in the constitution is anyone in the legislator or the courts given the power to remove a persons rights granted to them by the constitution

The Plaintiff has clearly and obviously presented to this Honorable Court prima facia evidence that his Constitutional rights have been violated and has been set aside by the Defendants.

The state, the legislator, even a vote of the people can not pass a law that is a violation of the constitutional rights granted to all people in this country. To say that because a person has committed a crime makes him/her a second class person and that his or her rights or the rights of his family members granted under the constitution can be taken away is wrong, the 14th Amendment states “NO State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” and to say that a person must wave or give up those rights in order to remain free or to stay together as a family is not only foolish but dangers. There is the idea that no person may sign themselves in to servitude. The fact that the state is forcing people register their where abouts continuously is a violation of that ideal.

The Nebraska legislatively body, has said that as a sex offender that the Plaintiff must complete registration . If that registration and notification removes from the Plaintiff and his/her family a chance to lead a normal lifes then no registration and notification, or if there is the possibility that the registration and notification are doing mental or emotional harm to the offender and his/her family or is likely to increase the chance of reoffence. Then the Plaintiff has been deprived of his liberty without sufficient cause and without due process. Such deprivation is prima facie, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. and must be construed as not merely a negligent practice but perhaps even as criminally conspiratorial to deprive the Plaintiff of his rights under the Federal Constitution.

The State has passed a set of laws that are stricter against sex offenders. Seeking to punish persons that have been involved in sexual offenses beyond the standard time in prison on parole and post prison supervision then is there for other types offenses. Sex offenders are a class of person they have protection under the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution and it is being violated by these laws.

. the forced lost of the Plaintiff’s civil rights violate the concept of ————–of the Nebraska Constitution. The fears placed in the Plaintiffs by the defendants does in fact constitutes actual injury (Jones v. Banks 818 S Supp 107).